censorship and patronage, and the development and evolution of new forms of associational life in the context of the Republic of Letters. Foucault's little essay titled "What Is an Author?" distinguishes between "biography," which is the social and historical analysis of a writer's life, and the "author-function," which determines the social value of a text. In particular, Foucault argues that the Enlightenment was a key period when a literary text aimed at a general readership (such as a play) first began to be seen as the unique expression of an individual author, while a text in a specialized field of knowledge, such as one of the sciences, was seen instead as a simple statement of truth in such a way that the author became less important than the various institutions that sanctioned and published the work. This distinction makes room in the creation and dissemination of scientific ideas for the collaboration of many individuals who adopt various and evolving roles in a variety of formal and informal institutions.
The impact that Foucault's essay has had on Enlightenment studies is a little surprising because the actual historical content of that essay has been challenged very effectively by Enlightenment scholars such as Roger Chartier (1994) . Historians of science have similarly questioned Foucault's claim, arguing that scientific writing was not validated by impersonal academies but that the truth-value of a text depended very much on the trust placed in a given author. The imprimatur of the academies did not erase the significance of the author, but rather acknowledged that any author works in a social context. Nonetheless, Foucault's essay was a very striking rhetorical tool that intentionally undermined Immanuel Kant's concept of individual "genius," which, until then, dominated the way in which intellectual creation was conceived in Enlightenment studies (and, we argue, in the history of economics to this day).
Section 1 below examines some of the seminal texts in the history of economics to trace the development of the singular focus in our discipline on the creativity of the gifted individual. Section 2 examines some of the analytical tools, borrowed from other fields, that contributors to this collection found useful in their attempts to more fully portray the collective nature of intellectual creation. In the context of that examination, we juxtaposed two different visions of intellectual community: the "research school approach" borrowed from the history of science and associated with the names of J. B. Morrell and G. L. Geison, and the "collaborative circles approach" borrowed from social psychology and associated with the name of Michael P. Farrell. This juxtaposition yielded a set of distinct hypotheses about the nature of intellectual collaboration. Morrell and Gei- son emphasize the role of a charismatic and institutionally powerful leader and the ability of that leader to access and control resources and communications outlets. Farrell, by contrast, argues that innovation is likely to occur not in positions of power but rather at the fringes of a discipline, and emphasizes that the process of leadership is endogenous to group evolution and that different leaders emerge at different times to serve different needs. He notes that the interaction of group members is an exchange between equals rather than an interaction between a charismatic leader and dependent disciples. These two distinct visions are invoked by authors in this collection to describe very different kinds of communities, and one of the purposes of this collection is to gather together the analytical tools that have been used in other disciplines to analyze intellectual collaboration in order to determine whether there is any constancy in the ways that collaboration occurs or whether the nature of intellectual collaboration is simply an accident of time, place, and personality.
Inattention to Community in the History of Economic Thought
The communities dealt with in this issue of HOPE stretch over more than two centuries and two continents, but the authors of the articles conclude that there is a good deal to be learned in the history of economic thought from close examination of the intellectual communities in which economists have often been embedded through time. Some of these communities have been described as "schools" associated with a commanding individual (e.g., Quesnay and the physiocrats). Others are identified with single universities more than single individuals (e.g., Chicago, Harvard, and Virginia). Some of the communities examined here brought economists into close proximity with artists and intellectuals from other disciplines (e.g., the Vienna circle and Bloomsbury). Still others grew out of a commitment to a certain kind of policy that was widely controversial (e.g., economists in the Office of Economic Opportunity). What distinguishes a "community" from simply a random collection of individuals with whom economists have interacted is its continuous existence over time and its distinctive identity, at least when viewed historically. It is our general hypothesis that these communities can be treated usefully as distinct phenomena when we try to understand the history of economic thought and may be approached using tools from other fields such as the history of science, geography, social psychology, and literary theory. Economists, we find, are like other people and are affected in complex ways by the social groups of which they are a part. Therefore some of their history must involve the study of these groups in addition to the experience of the individuals.
Yet the fact remains that historians of economics until recently have paid remarkably little attention to intellectual communities. The work of Denis O'Brien (1975 on the classical economists, Malcolm Rutherford on the institutionalists, and Philip Mirowski on the economists at RAND stand out as exceptions, as do some major biographies; and a few collections of letters of economists demonstrate nicely their communal activities. But these are slim pickings. We reflect here on some of the possible reasons for this paradox of inattention to "community" in the history of economics.
Ironically, historians of economics were quick to appreciate progress in the history, sociology, and philosophy of science a half century ago, and in emulation they prepared studies using the work of Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and other philosophers and historians of science. They grasped that there could be approaches to their subject other than the familiar biographical narrative and textual exegesis. They knew about the studies of "big science" covering, in particular, the Manhattan Project and other war work. So why did they not follow these paths for economics? For the most part the history of economics has continued to be presented, especially in textbooks, through the familiar "Lewis and Clark" model wherein lonely and intrepid explorers push out the research frontier, sometimes supported by followers and sometimes impeded by them, but insufficiently engaged with colleagues overall to warrant close attention to them as a community. Why so? Could it be that an explanation for this myopia can be discerned by examining the landmark contributions of our distinguished forebears in what has been called elsewhere "the golden age of the history of economics" (Goodwin 2008 )? Were models leaving aside community established perhaps at this earlier time to which later historians came readily to adhere? Seeking answers to these questions we turned to some canonical works from the golden age, roughly the second quarter of the twentieth century. The authors represented a wide range of approaches to economics: conventional neoclassical microeconomics, the Scottish tradition of Adam Smith, Austrian economics, American institutional economics, and the ideological left. The works were The Development of Economic Doctrine (1931) , by Alexander Gray; Types of Economic Theory (1967 -69, prepared 1913 , by Wesley Clair Mitchell; Institutional Economics (1934) , by John R. Commons; Essays in Biogra-phy (1933) Philosophers (1953) , by Robert Heilbroner. In none of these works is the question addressed directly of whether communities should be explored in the history of economics. The nearest thing to a full discussion can be found in the works by Mitchell and Schumpeter. In most cases, however, positions can be discerned by inference. What follows is an account of findings from these works, and some interpretations of the findings.
All of the authors of these ten works did, in fact, pay some attention to intellectual communities that were relevant to the history of economics, although in most cases they did so just in passing. Indeed, a list of communities culled from their works (see table 1) is a useful guide for scholars today searching for examples of communities. These writers use a variety of terms and metaphors to describe communities, often with little distinction among them. The most popular terms are circle, movement, group, school, and the pejorative sect. The expression "Ricardo and his Circle," for example, was common parlance in these works (e.g., Mitchell 1967-69, 1:261) , as was "the group of Philosophical Radicals" (267). The reason given most often for mentioning communities is that they were thought to have increased (or in a few cases reduced) the impact of important innovators by making their work widely known and influential in the policy world. But there is little suggestion that these communities helped to stimulate the scientific achievement itself (e.g., Mitchell 1967-69, 1:190) . Even Wesley Mitchell, who predicated his enormous text on the need for greater attention to "context" in the history of economics, attended to the social and political background of great economists in minute detail but paid very little attention to the intellectual communities in which these economists lived and worked. While providing abundant biographical detail about many of the economists, he said little about the communal environments upon which some, at least, were dependent. Sometimes his approach is suggestive of the influence of community, as when he writes of Adam Smith's involvement with numerous clubs (1:135), but then he steps back. The implication in his work is that scientific advance is achieved by scientists working on their own; stimulation, dissemination, and implementation of their ideas may be by communities, but these communities are also One model that was popular among these historians in describing a group of like-minded scholars working together is a religious one; there a single "prophet" or "messiah" worked with disciples whose task it was to spread the gospel. The prophets in this rather unsavory model were, of course, often in competition with each other for disciples. Mitchell (1967-69, 2:98) wrote, "Edgeworth increasingly considered himself a disciple of Marshall, Jevons was thus left with relatively few disciples. Among the people definitely enlisted under his banner, one may note particularly his most faithful disciple, Philip H. Wicksteed." Similarly Schumpeter (1954, 223-24) wrote of the physiocrats, "They were all of them disciples, nay, pupils of Quesnay in the strictest and most meaningful sense these terms will bear-disciples who absorbed and accepted the master's teaching with a fidelity for which there are but two analogues in the whole history of economics: the fidelity of the orthodox Marxists to the message of Marx and the fidelity of the orthodox Keynesians to the message of Keynes. They were a school by virtue of doctrinal and personal bonds, and always acted as a group, praising one another, fighting one another's fights, each member taking his share in group propaganda. They would in fact illustrate the nature of that sociological phenomenon to perfection had they not been more than a scientific school: they formed a group united by what amounted to a creed; they were indeed what they had been called so often, a Sect. This fact naturally impaired their influence upon every economist, French or foreign, who was not prepared to take the vows to One Master and One Doctrine." Although this suggestive ecclesiastical metaphor of slavish obedience to a master was used rather casually, it was applied usually as an expression of contempt rather than of interpretation, and its appropriateness and implications were not questioned or explored in any depth. Schumpeter was especially scathing of the close followers of Karl Marx, "for whom the prophet's every word is eternal truth and for whom dissent spells not only error but sin" (384), and also of the Philosophical Radicals, whom he called the self-appointed "apostles" of utilitarianism: they were "at first a small circle that gathered round Bentham and James Mill" but who developed a strong "creed" and "propaganda machine" (408, 409). Schumpeter's discussion of the physiocratic community around Quesnay is tantalizing because it seems poised to address interesting topics. But Schumpeter pulls back, almost embarrassed that he should contemplate going there. He writes, "The school was thoroughly alive to the importance of propaganda and some of its members, Baudeau and Dupont especially, were very good at it. They founded discussion groups, worked upon individuals and agencies in key positions (the parlements especially), and produced a large quantity of popular and controversial literature. Their exploits in economic journalism, however interesting in themselves, would not have to be mentioned here were it not for the fact that, rising above it, they also produced the bulk of the material that went into the pages of the first scientific periodicals in the history of economics" (226). Schumpeter even confessed that he was opposed to examining any community too closely in the history of economics because of "the optical illusion that will victimize any historian of doctrine who concentrates his vision upon a particular group and pays inadequate attention to what lies around and, historically, before it" (231).
Perhaps the answer to the puzzle of why in fact these great historians of economics paid so little attention to community may lie in one of these canonical works, Schumpeter's History of Economic Analysis. There he explains that a "vision" must precede all analytical work, including presumably the history of economics; this is "a preanalytic cognitive act that supplies the raw material for the analytical effort" (42). One vision may succeed another, but the mode of analysis will remain the same. "On the one hand, we assemble further facts in addition to those perceived already, and learn to distrust others that figured in the original vision; on the other hand the very work of constructing the schema or picture will add further relations and concepts to, and in general also eliminate others from, the original stock" (42). Schumpeter admitted that within economics "ideology" as well as conventional scientific observations might help to shape a vision. He credited Marx with recognizing that "people's ideas are likely to glorify the interests and actions of the classes that are in a position to assert themselves and therefore are likely to draw or to imply pictures of them that may be at serious variance with the truth" (35). Moreover, Schumpeter speculated that in the history of economics a "habit of mind" that we call "rationalization" was also likely to be present. "This habit consists in comforting ourselves and impressing others by drawing a picture of ourselves, our motives, our friends, our enemies, our vocation, our church, our country, which may have more to do with what we like them to be than with what they are" (35).
So if, as Schumpeter suggests, the history of economics can be seen as a vision influenced by ideology and the need for rationalization, how does this help us understand the neglect of community? The vision we see in Schumpeter's history of economics, and in the writings of the other major historians of economics at the time, may be described as two dimensional. In both dimensions community has little place. One dimension seems grounded in the historians' perception of their own professional lives as economists. The other dimension is turned toward the discipline in which they have been trained.
The vision of the economics profession these historians shared seems to be very much of pioneer loners, as discussed above. They saw themselves to be out to persuade the world of their insights and wisdom and struggling against mighty forces standing in their way. Schumpeter appreciated the development of some "groups" within the economics discipline but he declined to explore them overall because of their behavior; as he said, "The group accepts or refuses to accept co-workers also for reasons other than their professional competence or incompetence. In economics this grouping took long to mature but when it did mature it acquired much greater importance than it did in physics" (47). Schumpeter sees groups in economics as a current problem, and it is as if to give groups recognition in the history is to give them credibility in the present.
Perhaps the Darwinian thinking with which all of these men grew up helped to strengthen their emphasis on individual struggle as the appropriate route to accomplishment: survival of the unfit, perhaps assisted by communal institutions of some kind, could stifle progress. It is significant that all these historians were prominent practicing economists and in varying degrees in their histories they were writing their autobiographies. They saw their own success as achieved through heroic solitary struggle and they saw no reason to examine an alternative model. Their emphasis on the contributions of individuals over communities is evident sometimes even in the titles of their works: for example, Schumpeter's Ten Great Economists and Keynes's Essays in Biography.
Just as much as these economists were deeply influenced by their own professional experiences and their self-image as successful independent pioneers and innovators, their vision of the discipline that they practiced, and its body of theory, also affected the form taken by their history. In their historical studies of scientific progress in economics they described a process that was quite like what they saw operating in the economy. Competition among many participants in a market yielded good results; concentrated markets in which groups conspired were problematic. Efficiency in the progress of ideas, just as in the economic system, required choice under constraints. Competition among economic scientists was most likely to bring this about. They told the history of economics as first the generation of good and bad ideas across a broad spectrum, and then their natural selection. The historian's role, just as that of the economist, was to identify those that deserved to survive in the marketplace, in this case of ideas, and those that did not. Progress in the economy as well as in economic science occurred when societies, led by their economists, chose wisely among alternative systems of ideas and the policies that were implied by these ideas. Jacob Viner (1937, 2) described his task in examining ideas about international trade before Smith as preparing "an inventory of the English ideas, good and bad." From this inventory he could then instruct society to adopt the good and eschew the bad. Just as economic progress was achieved by using the best and most appropriate technology, so social progress could be achieved by using the best systems of economic ideas that historians of ideas had identified. One of the main obstacles to acceptance of best policies and practices in the economy was collusion among economic actors, and collusion among thinkers might represent an obstacle as well when it came to producing the best ideas. The limitation of competition among ideas through the formation of collusive groups, as among participants in a market, led too often to inefficiencies and should not be tolerated and recorded favorably in a historical account. Collective activity of almost every kind in the intellectual realm, as in the markets of a nation, should be viewed with deep suspicion. Collusion (community?) was too often the device of scoundrels to achieve their selfish objectives: rents and destructive bureaucratic schemes. John Kenneth Galbraith put it well in The New Industrial State. He wrote:
The individual has far more standing in our culture than the group. An individual has a presumption of accomplishment; a committee has a presumption of inaction. . . . The entrepreneur-individualistic, restless, with vision, guile and courage-has been the economist's only hero. (Galbraith 1967, 60) On occasion in these histories the authors cannot resist noting wistfully that some communal activity among economists seemed to have had a constructive outcome. But then they observe that this was an exception and the outcome might have been negative. For example, Mitchell (1967-69, 1:143) reported that Adam Smith's liberal views on trade were strengthened by his association for over thirteen years with free-trade merchants in the Glasgow Political Economy Club. But if these merchants had been protectionist, it was frightening to think of what the consequences might have been. Mitchell had unbounded admiration for the contributions of the Philosophical Radicals to social reform in Great Britain. "Their sciences taken as a group laid down a program of social reconstruction which has no equal in the world today for scope, consistency and confidence" (381). Yet he expresses unease about what might have been if this intellectual juggernaut had gotten off on the wrong foot. How would such a powerful community have complicated the Darwinian struggle in the marketplace of ideas? Certainly the Philosophical Radicals were not perfect. "The basic trouble with their technical position was that their ideas of human nature were curiously schematic and unreal" (470). But because of their strength they were able to influence many disciplines, not always for the better. "They dipped into the broad field of the social sciences at certain specific points, but they did not succeed in working out the problems, for example, of jurisprudence, of ethics, of economics, and of pedagogy so far that the edges of these disciplines overlapped; that is, they did not fuse their social sciences with each other; they did not achieve complete unity and consistency" (393). Would it not have been better for the progress of science if members of the group of Philosophical Radicals had worked on their own?
Mitchell seemed to ask the same question of other groups that he encountered, such as the Clapham sect, the Chartists, and the Fabians (393, 412, 420) . At the very least it worried him that sometimes these groups placed political objectives ahead of scientific ones, which was not to be applauded in a history of science. This was especially true, for example, of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, which had helped "in no small degree to influence public opinion in favor of larger state activity" (2:523).
Clearly it is too much to attribute all of the inattention to community in the history of economics to the patterns established by these early pioneers, but perhaps it is not too much to suggest that these patterns may be part of the explanation not only for this aspect of the history but others as well.
Analytical Methods
The contributors to this collection have looked at a variety of communities on two continents over almost three centuries. Yet, despite the apparent range, each intellectual community adheres to one of three types.
First, there is a recognizable "research school" or "research group" that is comprised of a relatively homogenous group of scholars in a single discipline who choose to tackle related problems with similar tools of analysis. Often, but not always, these scholars work together in a single physical space for at least some part of their history. This type of group characterizes Robert Cord's analysis of the Keynesian school, Steven Medema's consideration of the Virginia school of political economy, and the examination of Quesnay's workshop by Christine Théré and Loïc Charles. Evelyn Forget's analysis of the Office of Economic Opportunity in the 1960s considers a second type of community. In this case, the community members are not academics but rather policy analysts employed by a government agency, constrained to some extent by the political ambitions of their overseers, yet with enough intellectual freedom to seize and shape a policy issue in particular ways. A third sort of community is that of which Bloomsbury may be the ideal type. An interdisciplinary group of intellectuals trades insights and methods across problems and fields of application, but the geography and friendship of their interaction still make them a recognizable community. Robert Leonard and Annie Cot, along with Craufurd Goodwin, conduct analyses that fall into this category. Each type of community exhibits a number of features, some common and some unique to the type of collaboration under consideration, and the question that we pose is whether we can predict the success of an intellectual community by how closely it aligns with some key characteristics.
The "Research School" Approach
When we imagine intellectual collaboration today, the image that comes to mind is most often that of a research school. Participants are academics, very often employed at the same university, especially in a school's earliest days, who gauge their success by publications in key journals and colonization of important graduate programs through the placement of graduate students in good positions. It is perhaps not surprising that one of the best tools of analysis for this type of community, as Robert Cord shows us, is borrowed from the history of science and was developed in the first instance to predict the success and failure of laboratorybased research schools (Cord 2009 ).
In 1972, J. B. Morrell published an important article that became one of the most influential essays in the history of science, so much so that in 1993 the journal Osiris published a special issue on "research schools" in the history of science (Morrell 1972; Geisen and Holmes 1993) . One important innovation in research-school analysis was introduced by A. J. Rocke in 1993, when he distinguished between two types of schools that he labeled institutional and cognitive. An institutional school is characterized by a common location, usually a university department in which all key players interact regularly, whereas a cognitive school exists when a group of individuals support the research program of a school but are geographically dispersed and consequently interact less frequently.
While Morrell simply introduced the characteristics of a successful school, G. L. Geison (1981, 24) listed the fourteen characteristics of a successful school:
1. "Charismatic" leader(s) 2. Leader with research reputation 3. "Informal" setting and leadership style 4. Leader with institutional power 5. Social cohesion, loyalty, esprit de corps, "discipleship" 6. Focused research program 7. Simple and rapidly exploitable experimental techniques 8. Invasion of new field of research 9. Pool of potential recruits (graduate students) 10. Access to or control of publication outlets 11. Students publish early under own names 12. Produced and "placed" significant number of students 13. Institutionalization in university setting 14. Adequate financial support It seems clear that some of these characteristics are more important than others, and recent work has begun to assess the relative significance of each in predicting success (Geison and Holmes 1993; Cord 2009 ).
Economics, of course, is not a laboratory-based science, and one wonders whether the extremely hierarchical nature of the laboratory carries into other fields. The hierarchical nature of collaboration in the MorrellGeison framework is consistent with the findings of Harriet Zuckerman (1967) , who found that the most eminent scientists tended to be students of other eminent scientists, but somewhat distinct from the findings of Nicholas Mullins (1973) , who studied patterns of collaboration in sociology and molecular biology.
1. We thank Roy Weintraub for directing us to the work of Randall Collins and noting its relevance to our project.
Randall Collins examines the social connections between philosophers in his 1998 book titled The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global
Theory of Intellectual Change. 1 Collins, examining the intellectual history of philosophy, pays great attention to the social connections between philosophers. He argues that the channel that carries the energies of intellectual creativity is more than ideas floating in an atmosphere of influence, even if we can pin down such influence to the presence of a certain text in the personal library of a certain thinker; the central channel is the personal contact of face-to-face encounters. (Collins 1998, 65) Such face-to-face encounters, he notes, occur in the context of two fundamental types of connection. One is the hierarchical connection between teachers and students that motivated the analyses of Morrell and Geison. The second, however, stresses the horizontal connections that emerge between peers and even rivals:
The most notable philosophers are not organizational isolates but members of chains of teachers and students who are themselves known philosophers, and/or of circles of significant contemporary intellectuals. The most notable philosophers are likely to be students of other highly notable philosophers. In addition to this vertical organization of social networks across generations, creative intellectuals tend to belong to groups of intellectual peers, both circles of their lives and sometimes also of rivals and debaters. (65) Both types of connections appear, to a greater or lesser extent, in the case studies in this collection.
Collaborative Circles
Research schools are the most recognizable type of collaborative community to contemporary academics, with policy settings a close second, but political economists have never worked exclusively in these settings and the further their work takes them from these institutions, the less structured their interactions seem to become and the less well the MorrellGeison framework seems to fit. Michael P. Farrell's Collaborative Circles:
2. Collins explicitly examined the ways in which Farrell's work compared with his own findings in a 2004 review of the latter's book published in Social Forces.
3. This is interesting because Forget's discussion of the Office of Economic Opportunity during the 1960s emphasizes the key role that delinquency theory played for one set of actors in that drama. See her article in this issue.
4. An empirical claim contradicted by the findings of Collins (1998) and Zuckerman (1967 Mullins (1973) , he pays great attention to the interaction among these peers over time and attempts to discern typical patterns of group evolution.
Farrell (2001) defines a collaborative circle as "a set of peers in the same discipline" who, over time, develop into an interdependent group "with a common vision that guides their creative work" (266). Members of this group engage in an exchange of "support, ideas and criticism" (266). Unlike Morrell and Geison, Farrell does not confine his analysis to university-based or research laboratory-based groups but extends it to include groups of artists such as the French impressionists, poets, novelists, psychoanalysts, and political activists. Because he sees the roots of intellectual collaboration in human psychology, he emphasizes the personal characteristics of group members and leaders and deemphasizes the institutional features that give rise to successful collaboration. Farrell grounds his analysis in the delinquency theory that played a key role in sociology in the 1960s (Farrell 2001, 271; Short and Strodtbeck 1965; Cohen 1965) . 3 Like Morrell and Geison, Farrell claims that successful collaborations tend to be associated with a set of structural factors. For Farrell, however, these structural factors have little to do with controlling the institutions and means of communication in a discipline. Indeed, successful collaborations, he claims, are most likely to occur not "in a magnet place where the high-status masters are gathered, but within the valleys on the periphery of that network" (2001, 267) . That is, Farrell claims that it is the absence of institutional power that generates creative collaborations, with groups of talented and ambitious, but relatively marginal, actors joining forces and seeking from their peers the support that the existing channels of disciplinary power deny them. Indeed, this is the same claim that Daryl Chubin made about science in 1976: that it is the people in marginal positions in a science who are most likely to be the source of new ideas. 4 Farrell also imagines the cultural conditions that favor group formation in a more turbulent fashion than do Morrell and Geison, emphasizing to a greater extent the contest for supremacy in a discipline than the eventual success of one vision or another. Farrell (2001, 268-69) claims that innovation occurs most frequently at times and places where two or more different visions are already in a battle to dominate a discipline. For those holding established positions of power, the challenge results in greater adherence to existing ideas and the emergence of competing camps at war with one another, but for people at the periphery of a discipline the reaction is quite different. Encouraged to examine the assumptions underlying competing visions, marginalized actors are empowered to challenge established intellectuals and to develop their own perspectives on the field. Farrell notes that competing visions can emerge from a variety of provocations: rapid social change, contact with new ideas or cultures, technological change in society, or rapid change in the demographics of a discipline as, for example, more women enter a profession or a cohort of key figures retires (269).
Farrell places more emphasis on the interaction of group members than does Morrell or Geison, claiming that successful collaborations are more likely to occur when group members share a set of attitudes and values, often stemming from a shared social background (272-73). The fact that groups often coalesce in magnet areas strengthens this tendency toward homogeneity because those attracted to the magnet place will often share similar characteristics. A key figure in the group, called the "gatekeeper" by Farrell, will often play an explicit role by introducing potential members to one another and encouraging interaction (273).
Another key difference between the analyses of Morrell and Geison on the one hand, and Farrell on the other, is that the latter explicitly grounds collaborative dynamics in the context of exchange-that is, members "exchange" support, ideas, and criticism. Unlike Morrell and Geison, who emphasize the directorial role of a leader, Farrell focuses on the equality of exchange within a group. Citing Pierre Bourdieu's Field of Cultural Production (1993), Farrell distinguishes between social, economic, and cultural capital and claims that, while each member will have comparatively greater amounts of some rather than other forms of capital, the circle dynamics work only if there is perceived to be a rough equality between members. That is, Keynes may have had greater economic capital than the Bloomsbury artists, but that is balanced (according to Farrell's analysis) by the greater cultural capital of a Virginia Woolf or Vanessa Bell. The exchange must be perceived as "fair" (274-76).
Finally, Farrell endogenizes the process of leader selection. While Morrell and Geison emphasize the role of a charismatic leader, Farrell's greater emphasis on interaction within the collaborative circle predisposes him to recognize different stages in the life cycle of collaboration with demands for different kinds of leadership emerging at different times (276-90).
In an "ideal" collaboration that has run its full course, Farrell recognizes six different stages of development: formation, rebellion, quest, collective action, disintegration, and reunion (277). In the first tentative stages of group formation, the leader plays the role of "gatekeeper," introducing potential collaborators and encouraging nascent friendships. As the group begins to coalesce, a different leadership role emerges: the group has identified its project and has begun to rebel against the established leaders in a discipline, and this requires the role of charismatic leader who is conceived in terms not dissimilar to those introduced by Morrell. This individual, who may be the same individual who played the role of gatekeeper or someone quite different, is surrounded by other group members who play different and necessary roles, including that of peacemaker. As the group matures and the work becomes less confrontational and more routine, the need for a charismatic leader is gradually subordinated to the requirement of the group for an executive manager. Finally, as groups run their course and begin to disintegrate, all roles begin to break down. If, eventually, a group reunites, it may well be a different individual again who takes on the role of "alumni organizer."
Craufurd Goodwin demonstrates that the dynamics of Bloomsbury are precisely the sort of interaction imagined by Farrell. Annie Cot, however, offers a fascinating glimpse of an interdisciplinary group of intellectuals, all of whom choose to focus on a single analytical idea and who explore this idea in a common intellectual and geographic space at Harvard, who nevertheless do not coalesce into an intellectual community. Why do some intellectual communities work and others not? Why do the Harvard scientists emphasize their unique spin on a common theme even as they try to borrow insights from one another? Why does the collaboration that appears as if it would benefit each never happen?
Farrell's orientation is quite different from that of Morrell and Geison, but the juxtaposition of the two approaches does seem to yield a set of testable hypotheses to be explored, to a greater or lesser extent, in the papers in this collection:
1. Are group members "marginalized" or in positions of institutional power within a discipline when the collaboration begins? 2. Is there a clearly defined "charismatic leader" or do different individuals take on different leadership roles over the life cycle of the collaboration? 3. Are group members perceived roughly equal in terms of the sum of economic, social, and cultural capital at their disposal, or is there a clear leader with subordinate disciples?
It may indeed be the case that university-based collaborations are distinct from other forms of creative collaboration. If so, it is important to recognize how recently these emerged in the history of our discipline, and how many areas of economic activity, such as policymaking, still stand apart.
Policy Networks
Economic creativity exists not only in the context of an academic setting, but also in applications of economic insights to policy questions. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in the 1960s is a nice case study because two different communities of experts battled for supremacy on a policy issue. Can we explain which eventually emerged victorious, or is the political context simply too idiosyncratic for analytical clarity? There is no checklist of characteristics that signal the victory of an emerging policy network. Hugh Heclo (1977) introduced the idea of a policy network, at least partially as an attempt to explain the failure of many of the Great Society programs for which the OEO was partly responsible. Until the 1970s, policy outcomes were generally explained by "the iron triangle"-the interaction of elected members of Congress, career bureaucrats, and interest groups. Heclo argued that this was an incomplete vision of the policy process that tended to place too much weight on the powerful few to the neglect of the many others who guide the policy process. These overlooked others he referred to as an "issue network."
Issue networks can be hard to define and difficult to identify in practice because they evolve over time as one part of the network gains in influence and others decline. It might include powerful interest groups as well as key individuals, and these individuals may or may not work for the government. In fact, for much of the twentieth century American policymakers moved back and forth between the academic and policy worlds, spending some time in universities and other periods in different governmental departments. The key characteristic of an issue network is fluidity: people within the network recognize one another as experts, but individuals typically move into and out of the network over time. Heclo emphasizes the intellectual and emotional commitment of participants. Far from being career bureaucrats, members of an issue network are committed to certain issues and outcomes, often continuing to advocate particular policies at personal and career costs even when the political situation changes and the likelihood of success is greatly reduced.
The defining characteristics of issue networks are fluidity and power. What makes one network victorious and others failures? Charismatic leadership and the ability to attract and retain powerful collaborators are as important in an issue network as in any research school, but it is the interplay of different kinds of power and leadership over time that defines victory or defeat. There is, at base, an inescapable instability in issue networks that need not characterize research schools. Policymakers ultimately derive their authority from a larger political process that they can influence, but cannot control.
Geographies of Interaction
All three types of community explored in this collection emphasize geography. Collaborations that occur in the context of university departments or research spaces share not only a magnet place but the physical settingthe architecture-that contains their interactions. Robert Leonard's article focuses on the cafés within which collaborators met informally as much or more than formal settings from which his protagonists were alienated. Bloomsbury is identified with certain town houses and country houses; the interaction of key players would be very different in a different setting. Eighteenth-century Versailles is as different from eighteenth-century Paris, as twentieth-century Washington, D.C., differs from twentiethcentury Boston. These factors were indispensable considerations for each author in this collection. 
Unfinished Business
Intellectual interaction, in these studies, is the product of what Margaret Gilbert has called the "plural subject"-a group of individuals who have chosen to work collaboratively to achieve their goals. This collaboration requires the submission of an individual will to the purpose of the group, and the collaboration is enhanced by common informal structures and common values (Gilbert 1989 (Gilbert , 1996 (Gilbert , 2000 (Gilbert , 2006 . One fundamental issue that emerges out of these case studies is whether members of an intellectual community relate to one another as part of an institutionalized hierarchy, such as a university department, or whether their interaction is characterized by an equality of exchange. Most groups of political economists identified in table 1 rest somewhere along a continuum that might be characterized by the Virginia school at one end and Bloomsbury at the other. If we are to pay more attention to the nature of collective creativity in the history of economics, then the issue of evolving power relationships between group members becomes a central consideration.
A second, and by no means unrelated, issue is the nature of leadership within an intellectual community. Leadership is a complex issue that is merely papered over by the label "charismatic." Not one of the authors who offer us analytical tools to understand collective creativity does a very good job of defining "charismatic"; most seem to imagine that we will recognize charismatic leadership when we see it. In fact, as these case studies demonstrate, charisma is highly time-and circumstance-dependent. François Quesnay and Sargent Shriver were both charismatic, in the sense that both were attention seekers who were more or less adept at maneuvering in the halls of true political power. But there the similarity ends. What passes for political power in eighteenth-century Versailles is different than political power as exercised in a modern state with a professionalized bureaucracy such as twentieth-century Washington, D.C., and the characteristics that define a good courtier do not necessarily define someone who can wrest resources to support a policy agenda or keep the lid on the sectarian disputes of the Democratic Party or Congress. Even less similar is what passes for charisma in a current academic setting where the bar tends to be set somewhat lower. Do we mean someone who can access resources, or perhaps attract the attention of important gatekeepers in the profession? Do we mean someone who can attract attention outside the academy, in the press, or in the political arena? Or do we mean someone who can draw colleagues and students to his research agenda? Even more significantly, these case studies demonstrate that leadership is not necessarily a static characteristic, and it does not necessarily inhere in the same individual as a group evolves. As Farrell recognized, leadership needs change, and successful collaborative circles are those that can manage the turbulent times associated with the passing of the baton.
If we are to take seriously the analysis of collective creation in the history of economics, then we need to think much more clearly about how highly ambitious, creative, and productive individuals behave in a community. Rather than focusing on the "genius" of the individual political economist and asking how that genius emerged from his early education, family circumstances, chance encounters, and so on-the biography of the political economist-we need to ask how individuals seek one another out to mutually create new ideas and new texts. We need to problematize the very concept of authorship and recognize that no text and no idea emerge from a single consciousness. How does an individual play into and transform a complex of formal and informal institutions to create a work that resonates with others at a particular time and place? Authorship is a social act. Groups, however, always require leaders, and what has become very clear from these case studies is that historians of economics have not developed a nuanced view of intellectual leadership. If there is a research agenda that emerges from these case studies, it rests on these two ideas: 
